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1. Introduction 
In mid-2001 a carrier battle group was underway to 
its new assignment in the Persian Gulf.  Its mission 
was to perform a presence patrol and to provide 
naval aviation to conduct Operation Southern 
Watch.  The battle group arrived on location just 
after the September 11th attack on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon.  Thus, its mission was 
changed significantly – from peacetime presence 
and Southern Watch to playing a major role in 
Operation Enduring Freedom.  Many aspects of the 
mission were different:  the tempo of operations 
changed from a moderate tempo (where there was 
time allocated for maintenance and training in 
addition to flying) to high-tempo sustained 
operations in support of the troops (Special 
Operations Force, Marines, Afghani Freedom 
Fighters, etc.) on the ground.  The mission had also 
changed radically:  the country of interest was 
different and the mission tasks were different.  
That is, the previous tasks that involved countering 
anti-aircraft systems and an integrated air defense 
system changed to a totally different set of tasks, 
i.e., all in support of ground forces. 
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Over the past several years, researchers within the ONR-sponsored Adaptive 
Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research program have been 
investigating the concept of organizational “congruence”.  These model-based 
theories loosely state that the better an organization is matched structurally to the 
overall mission (as measured using a multi-variant set of workload/congruence 
metrics) the better will that organization perform – and that mismatches are potential 
drivers for adaptation of organization structure. 
 
In order to test the congruence theories and their corollaries in a laboratory 
experiment, our approach was to seek two sufficiently disparate organizational 
structures and then design two missions (or scenarios) that would exploit the 
differences in these two structures.  One scenario would be “tuned” to organization 1 
to exhibit a high degree of congruence, but at the same time it would be 
“mismatched” (i.e., exhibit low congruence) with organization 2.  Conversely, the 
second scenario would be engineered to be congruent with organization 1, but 
incongruent with organization 2.  This paper describes the selection of the two 
organizations, and the model-driven design of the two scenarios. 
 
This actual scenario is but one example of how 
military forces need to be adaptable to 
accommodate changes in mission that will occur as 
part of the nature of warfare.  In response to this 
need, the Adaptive Architectures for Command 
and Control (A2C2) research program integrates 
optimization, modeling, and simulation-based 
research efforts with psychology-based and 
experimental activities to address key issues in 
command and control.  The research has followed 
a model-experiment-model paradigm wherein 
models produced by the modeling/simulation 
efforts support the formulation of hypotheses, the 
determination of key variables and parameter 
values, and the prediction of organizational 
performance and processes of adaptation.  The 
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experimental data, in turn, are collected and 
produced in such a way that allows for both 
examination of the hypotheses and ease of use by 
the modelers for post-experimental model-data 
comparison and model refinement.  
 
One of the major thrusts of the A2C2 research has 
been the development of models and constructs to 
design organizations that are matched to a given 
mission that they plan to perform [Levchuck et al, 
2002a, 2002b].  A salient factor that has emerged 
from this work is the concept of organizational 
“congruence”.  These theories loosely state that the 
better an organization is matched to the overall 
mission (as measured using a multi-variant set of 
workload/congruence metrics) the better will that 
organization perform – and that mismatches are 
potential drivers for organizational adaptation. 
 
Our approach for testing the congruence theories 
and their corollaries via laboratory experiment was 
to first seek two sufficiently disparate organiza-
tional structures and then design two missions (or 
scenarios) that would exploit the differences in 
these two structures.  In this “reverse engineering” 
approach one scenario would be “tuned” to 
organization 1 to exhibit a high degree of 
congruence, but at the same time this scenario 
would be “mismatched” (i.e., exhibit low 
congruence) with organization 2.  Clearly, the 
opposite would be necessary for the other scenario. 
 
This paper, along with a companion paper that 
focuses extensively on the concomitant analytic 
modeling [Levchuck et al, 2003], describes the 
selection of the two organizations, and the model-
driven design of the two scenarios.  Section 2 
provides the background that lead up to the 
experiment; sections 3 and 4 define the overall 
operational/simulation context that was used; 
section 5 describes the two organizational 
structures that were selected; and section 6 gives 
the details behind the design/crafting of the two 
scenarios.  The experiment – number 8 on the list 
of A2C2 empirical milestones – was conducted at 
NPS in August and November 2002. 
 
2. The Road to Experiment 8 
Previous A2C2 experiments, and the concomitant 
models that supported the empirical efforts, 
focused extensively on the design of organizations 
that were congruent with a pre-defined mission.  
Over the course of these experiments, that have 
spanned 7+ years, the analytical models and the 
experimentation tools – most notably the 
Distributed Dynamic Decision-making (DDD) 
simulator [Kleinman, 1996] – have undergone 
considerable refinement, improvement, and 
extension in order to deal with the increasing 
complexity of relevant C2 issues (e.g., self-
synchronization, network-centric operations, time-
critical targeting, etc.).  Thus, Experiment 8 had a 
solid basis of previous work to guide its objectives 
and design, especially the goal to establish the 
experimental conditions in which the relationship 
between congruence and performance could be 
tested. 
 
It was not intended that Experiment 8 would start 
from “scratch”, but would build upon and adapt an 
earlier context/mission setting to meet our research 
goals.  The setting that we chose to begin from was 
a DDD experiment that was conducted in March 
2001 for the Chief of Naval Operations (N6C) that 
investigated the processes of self-synchronization 
in (six-person) functionally-organized versus 
divisionally/geographically-organized teams.  See 
[Hutchins, et al, 2001].  That experiment was not 
model-driven and employed only a single scenario.  
In June 2001 the A2C2 research team met to 
operationalize the basic approach for Experiment 
8.  It was decided that the organizational dimen-
sion would use a functional (F) and a divisional 
(D) structure suitably modified from those used in 
the N6C experiment.  Two scenarios would be 
designed: one scenario (d) would be congruent 
with organization D but would be “misfit”, or 
incongruent to organization F.  Conversely, the 
second scenario (f) would be congruent with 
organization F but misfit to organization D.  
 
Guided by the above operational framework, we 
undertook to design a preliminary or concept 
experiment [Diedrich et al, 2002], referred to as 
Concept-8 (C8), which had several purposes.  The 
first was to design and test modifications to the 
N6C organizations in order to make their structures 
either more functional or more divisional – i.e., to 
minimize the degree of commonality/overlap 
between them in an organizational sense.  The 
second aspect of the C8 experiment was to seek 
characteristics (in the task dimensions) that make 
certain tasks more or less difficult for each of the 
two organizational structures.  This was accom-
plished by examining relative performance on 
individual task classes, and via subject post-
experiment questionnaire.  Another aspect of the 
C8 work involved the upgrading and testing of the 
DDD simulator, as a number of features and 
enhancements were identified as being crucial to 
the success of Experiment 8.  A final aspect of the 
C8 effort involved identification of measures that 
would be needed for the model-based analysis of 
Experiment 8, and the development and introduc-
tion of a powerful post-processor tool that would 
supply the data needed to calculate those measures. 
  
3. Basic Constructs Behind Experiment 8 
 
3.1 Military Context for Experiment 8 
Experiment 8 (E8) utilized an underlying military 
situation similar to that used in the C8 experiment.  
With reference to Figure 1, Country A has invaded 
and occupied friendly Country B and has also 
seized Country B’s major port (PORT).  Currently, 
Joint Task Force (JTF) Agile is in position to 
commence offensive actions to drive Country A’s 
forces out of Country B.  If attacked, country A has 
threatened to use tactical ballistic (SCUD) missiles 
against island countries D and E that are U.S. 
allies.  In addition it has threatened to mine the 
sea-lanes to shut down all merchant traffic within 
the region.  Country C is sympathetic to Country 
A’s cause, and could align with Country A in 
opposing U.S. military actions. 
Country A’s forces are concentrated around their 
naval bases (NBE, NBW) and air bases (ABE, 
ABW), and are protecting a major bridge (BR).  It 
is likely that the entrances to the naval bases and 
port have been mined.  The enemy has an 
integrated air defense system that includes aircraft 
and surface-to-air missiles.  They have surface 
capability in the form of fast patrol boats and 
missile-firing destroyers.  In addition they have 
placed their coastal defense missiles in positions 
that give them maximum standoff against U.S. 
Navy ships. 
 
Joint Task Force Agile’s objectives are to establish 
air and sea dominance in the Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), to prepare the battlespace 
for the introduction of follow-on ground forces, to 
protect our allies in the region from SCUD 
missiles, and to protect itself (and neutral shipping) 
from enemy air and sea attack. 
 
3.2 Friendly Forces – JTF Agile 
A number of modifications were made to the 
construct of the JTF based on lessons learned from 
the C8 experiment.  We replaced ASW operations 
with mine-clearing operations, and replaced the 
JTF’s submarine, which had a limited role due its 
slow speed, with a third DDG.  (Thus, ASW as a 
warfare area was removed from the simulation.)  
We increased the role/capability of the FFG (which 
was somewhat isolated from the core action in C8) 
by giving this node “control” of an air wing – 
located at an Air Operations Facility (AOF) on 
Island E – thereby enabling the FFG to be involved 
in air defense over a fairly large segment of the 
AOR.  We further modified the JTF by adding 
Special Operations Forces (SOF), preinserted on a 
Forward Operating Base (FOB) in Country A, and 
created relevant offensive ground tasks to be 
accomplished by the SOF teams.  The inclusion of 
SOF and mine-clearing operations allowed us to 
increase the richness and complexity of the 
scenario(s) that would ultimately be designed via 





























Fig. 1  Experiment 8 Scenario AOR
 
Figure 1 shows the fixed location of the six major 
JTF assets: 3 destroyers (DDGA, DDGB, DDGC), 
a frigate (FFG), cruiser (CG) and aircraft carrier 
(CVN), plus the AOF and FOB referred to above.  
These locations were selected to provide an 
“optimal” anti-missile shield for islands D and E, 
to guard the sea lanes (the dark lines in Figure 1) 
and to be within strike range of key targets in 
country A.  Each platform (or node) contains a 
number of moveable subplatforms and/or weapons 
systems.  A subplatform (e.g., a fixed-wing 
aircraft, helicopter, UAV, SOF team, etc.) could be 
“launched” from its parent platform, maneuvered 
to its objective, but with a finite time duration and 
weapon load (number of “shots”) before having to 
return for refuel or reload.  The weapons on a 
platform (e.g., surface-to-air missiles) are “fire and 
forget” but are limited in number.  
Some of the other information in Table 1 includes 
the velocity of the subplatforms (mi/min), their 
endurance or available time, and the number of 
“shots” each can take before needing to return to 
its parent for reload.  The number of shots is 
equivalent to the number of tasks that a 
subplatform can process/attack with a full payload.  
The velocities are approximately 10X real-world 
values as the game is played at a 10:1 time scale.  
Some additional information, not shown on Table 
1, included the subplatform launch and weapon 
firing delay, and the duty cycle time between 
successive launches/firings. 
fixed platforms mi/min loadout (subplatforms and weapons)
DDGA Aegis-capable destroyer 0 6SM2, 2HARP, 8TLAM, 4TTOM, 3ABM, 1FAB, 1HH60, 1UAV
DDGB Aegis-capable destroyer 0 6SM2, 2HARP, 8TLAM, 4TTOM, 3ABM, 1FAB, 1HH60, 1UAV
DDGC Aegis-capable destroyer 0 6SM2, 2HARP, 8TLAM, 4TTOM, 3ABM, 1FAB, 1HH60, 1UAV
FFG Aegis-capable frigate 0 4SM2, 2HARP,                           1MH53, 1FAB, 1HH60, 1UAV
CG Aegis-capable cruiser 0 6SM2, 2HARP, 8TLAM, 3ABM, 1MH53, 1FAB, 1HH60, 1UAV
CVN Aircraft carrier 0 2F18A, 2F18S,                           1MH53, 1FAB, 1HH60, 1UAV
E2C AWACS - aircraft 0 sensors only - prepositioned for total air surveillance in AOR
FOB forward operating base 0 3SOF teams preinserted in Country A
AOF air ops facility on Island E 0 2F18A, 2F18S
subplatforms (reloadable) mi/min Tavail # shots weapons mi/sec range
F18A air-to-air defender 200 15min 2 SM2 standard surface-
air missile
5.0 100mi
F18S air-to-ground strike aircraft 200 15min 1 ABM anti-ballistic missile 7.0 85mi
MH53 helicopter mine clearer 40 60min 2 TLAM Tomahawk cruise 
missile
2.0 360mi
HH60 search and rescue helo 45 18min 1 TTOM tactical/steerable 
Tomahawk
2.0 500mi
UAV unmanned recon vehicle
sensor only
30 60min n/a HARP Harpoon anti-ship 
missile
1.5 60mi
FAB fast attack boat 25 20min 2
SOF special ops/SEAL team 40 60min f
Table 1:  Friendly Order of Battle - Task Force Agile  
The asset structure for JTF Agile, that remained 
exactly the same over all runs and all organizations 
for Experiment 8, is detailed in Table 1.  Note that 
all three DDG nodes have the same load-out: 
6SM2, 2HARP, 8TLAM, 4TTOM, 3ABM, 1FAB, 
1HH60 and 1UAV.  The carrier node has 2F18A, 
2F18S, 1MH53, 1FAB, 1HH60 and 1UAV, etc.  
Allocating the various subplatforms and weapons 
systems to the major platforms was done with a 
view towards equalizing the capabilities of the 
platforms, while still trying to keep these 
allocations close to “reality”, and within the 
workload limits of players who might be acting as 
commanders of the major nodes.  As will be 
discussed in Section 5, it is the different 
distribution of ownership of these various JTF 
assets among six players that defines the two 
organizational structures used in Experiment 8. 
 
In all of the runs the six (maneuverable) UAVs 
were pre-positioned in theatre at game start.  This 
avoided the lengthy start-up times as per C8 
needed to launch and fly the UAVs into position.  
In addition to the UAVs, each platform and 
subplatform (but not weapon) had sensor ability 
for detecting and identifying air, sea or ground 
contacts.  The sensor ranges for a given asset were 
generally different for different media, and often 
depended on the class of contact being sensed. 
 
3.3 Resource Categories and Asset Capabilities 
The manner in which we model the capabilities of 
the various assets and weapons has proven itself to 
be extremely flexible in past efforts.  The paradigm 
 
adopted for our model-driven experiments first 
defines a set/vector of resources R = [r1, r2, … ] 
that is relevant to the problem context at hand.  
Each element ri defines a resource category or 
warfare area.  Then, every asset is assigned a 
numerical value for each element ri, which defines 
that asset’s resource capabilities vector.  In 
addition, each task that is contained within the 
scenario is assigned a vector of resource 
requirements.  The paradigm requires the team to 
prosecute tasks in such a way that a task’s resource 
requirements are met by the summed resource 
capabilities of the assets allocated to that task.  For 
E8 the selected set of resource categories were: 
R = [AAW, Mines, ASuW, BMD, Strike, SAR, SOF] 
With these definitions, the capabilities of the assets 
in JTF Agile are given in Table 2.  Note that for 
this experiment we have elected to use 1 or 0 to 
indicate whether or not a particular asset (platform, 
subplatform, or weapon) has capability in any 
particular resource category, as opposed to using a 
continuum scale.  Thus, a surface-to-air standard 
missile (SM2) has AAW capability, as does an 
F18A.  [The one exception here is the F18S that 
has 2 units of STRIKE to indicate that its one 
attack has twice the “punch” of a TLAM.]  In 
particular note that we have gone to great lengths 
to give each asset capability in only one resource 
category.  While this may ignore the multi-
functional capability of some subplatforms, it was 
done to keep the associated modeling “clean” so 
that assets would not be considered for use in areas 
other than in their primary ones. 
 
Another fact to note is that the six primary 
platforms do not have any native or organic 
capabilities – all of their capabilities derive from 
their subplatforms and weapons systems.  This is a 
change from C8 where the self-defense of a 
particular platform using its organic systems 
became confounded with player roles in a 
functional organization.  Thus, the defense of a 
platform must now be accomplished by using the 
various JTF assets located on that platform as well 
as elsewhere. 
 
4.  Mission Task Graph 
The greatest limitation of C8 for model-driven 
experimentation was the fact that there was no 
mission plan (i.e., task graph) that defined a 
sequence of tasks or course of action that the JTF 
was to accomplish.  Experiment C8 dealt primarily 
with destroying enemy forces and self-defense, 
with no clear statement of what the “mission” 
objective was.  This was a source of complaint by 
the players, which we sought to remedy in 
Experiment 8.  Moreover, the modeling approach 
requires a task graph in order to determine the 
“optimal” allocation of assets to tasks in order to 
minimize the time span of the mission.  Thus, a 
well-defined mission is a backbone to both the 
experimental and analytical parts of the 
Experiment 8 effort, and provides a yardstick to 
measure the progress of teams as they move along 






















DDGA destroyer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DDGB destroyer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FFG frigate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CG cruiser 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CVN Aircraft carrier 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DDGC destroyer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E2C Air survellance a/c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
subplatforms:
F18A Air-to-air defender 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
F18S Strike aircraft 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
MH53 Mine clearing helo 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
HH60 Search & rescue helo 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
UAV Pilotless sensor a/c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FAB Fast attack boat 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
SOF Special Ops unit 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
weapons:
SM2 Surface-to-air missile 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ABM Anti-ballistic missile 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
TLAM Tomahawk missile 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
TTOM Tactical Tomahawk 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
HARP Anti-ship missile 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Asset Resource Capabilities
 
A task graph is basically a mission plan or course 
of action (COA) that shows the precedence 
relations among tasks.  After considerable 
adjustment via modeler-experimenter iteration, the 
task graph that emerged for E8 is shown in Figure 
2.  Since our objective was to design two scenarios, 
we made the decision that both scenarios would be 
based on the same task graph, with the salient 
differences being only in the individual task 
requirements and enemy force dispositions.  One 
of our original thoughts was to construct the two 
scenarios to have radically different task graphs or 
missions (e.g., disaster relief versus amphibious 
operation).  But the reality of needing to train 
subjects to perform two very different missions in 
the limited time these players were available to the 
project made such an approach infeasible – not to 
mention the time and resources that it would have 
taken to build a second scenario. 
 
Other tasks shown in Figure 2 are the search and 
rescues (SARs), which we treat as high priority 
mission tasks, and the desire to clear SAM sites in 
the northern half of Countries A and B to allow 
unhampered use of this airspace.  A primary 
(aggregated) task of the JTF is to protect the island 
countries D and E from SCUD missile attacks, 
either by destroying the launchers (SML) on the 
ground or shooting down the launched missiles 
(AMIS).  The JTF also must protect its own assets 
from enemy air and surface threats.  These 
aggregated defend tasks are shown symbolically in 
Figure 2 along with the possible subtasks that 
make up the higher-level task. 










































As noted, two scenarios were constructed based on 
the task graph of Figure 2, where a major factor 
distinguishing the scenarios was the requirements 
vector for each of the individual task classes.  The 
development of the two scenarios is given in 
section 6. 
 
5.  Selection of Organizational Structures 
The precursor C8 experiment examined both a 
functional (F) and a divisional (D) six-node 
organizational structure performing a single 
mission that consisted of a variety of complex 
tasks.  The primary distinctions between the two 
structures were asset ownership (who owned what) 
and locus of responsibility.  The functional 
structure was organized such that each commander 
specialized in a single aspect of the mission (e.g. 
strike or surface warfare) over the entire battle 
space, controlling relevant assets that were 
distributed across multiple platforms (ships).  By 
contrast, commanders in the divisional structure 
controlled a single multi-functional platform (e.g., 
DDG or CVN) that to a large extent was able to 
process a variety of functional tasks in only a 
portion of the battle space.  The organizations 
selected for the current experiment were 
modifications and refinements to those of C8. 
Fig. 2: Mission Task Graph, Experiment 8 
 
The mission tasks are shown as circles in Figure 2.  
These are the tasks that must be done, are “known” 
and planned for in advanced, and generally follow 
a prerequisite structure that establishes a task 
processing sequence.  This course of action or plan 
first destroys the enemy command center (CTR) 
and then (with the aid of SOF) captures ABE and 
NBE that will serve as bases for the introduction of 
our follow-on air and sea forces.  ABE and NBE 
are likely to be defended by ground forces (RGF) 
that present obstacles to the SOF teams.  In 
addition, mines at the entrance to NBE need to be 
cleared.  In parallel with the above tasks, first 
NBW and then ABW are to be destroyed.  Prior to 
destroying ABW it is necessary to destroy a key 
bridge on the road between NBW and ABW to 
deny the enemy his ability to reinforce ABW.  
Mobile SAM sites (SA3) protect ABW.  Having 
completed ABW and NBE, the final objective of 
securing Country B’s PORT can be achieved once 
the mines have been cleared.  Several of the 
mission tasks, especially those that need SOF to 
accomplish, may spawn an evacuation of wounded 
(EVA) as a consequence of performing that task.  
These medivac/EVA tasks are shown symbolically 
on the task graph as an M within an oval. 
 
The C8 experiment hinted that testing the 
congruence theories in an experimental setting 
would be best served if the “distance” between the 
two organizational structures (F and D) was 
maximized to mitigate the inevitable variance 
when dealing with human teams.  Thus, it was 
prudent to further “separate” the F and D 
organizations to obtain two extreme cases of these 
organizational structures.  We took guidance from 
the research work at Michigan State University 
that examined a four-person team that was 
organized across either functional or divisional 
lines [Hollenbeck et al, 2002].   Thus, we strove to 
have each node in the D organization have 
capability in as many functional warfare areas as 
possible.  Likewise, it was desired that each 
functional node would control associated 
functional assets (subplatforms or weapons) 
distributed over all six primary platforms – with 







The selection of assets within the composite JTF 
and their capabilities proscribes what is capable of 
being achieved organizationally.  These assets – 
and their allocation to parent platforms as shown in 
Table 1 plus their capabilities as in Table 2 – were 
crafted to best allow for building an F and D 
organization that met the above-noted design 
goals.  Associated with this asset mix is the 
following set of eight possible functional warfare 
areas:   
 
AAW = anti-air warfare 
Mines = mine-clearing operations 
ASuW = anti-surface warfare 
BMD = ballistic missile defense 
Strike = strike warfare 
SAR = search and rescue 
SOF = special/ground operations   
ISR = intel/survellance/recon 
 
Note that these warfare areas closely follow the 
categories in the resource vector.  An early 
decision in the design of Experiment 8 was to 
constrain the organization(s) to six player or 
decisionmaker (DM) nodes – all at the same level 
– plus a seventh node (DM0) which represented 
the CJTF.  This was identical to the structure that 
was used in the previous N6C and C8 experiments.  
The CJTF was actually present in the experiment 
but was not involved actively in the game play and 
owned no assets.  [However, the CJTF node was a 
useful element in the training/mission rehearsal 
trials.]  The six-node limit meant that some nodes 
or players in F would have to assume two hats:  
We combined Mines with ASuW, and SOF with 
SAR as these aggregations made the most sense 
operationally.  The D organization was relatively 
straightforward as each of the six player nodes 
corresponded to one of the major platforms in 
Table 1. 
   
With the nodes so defined, the allocation of assets 
to nodes for both the D and F organizations is 
shown in Table 3.  The divisional (D) organization 
nodes are shown in the horizontal rows and reflect 
the assets and weapons on the major platforms.  In 
this organization a player is a platform 
commander.  The aircraft “owned” by the FFG are 
those located on the AOF on Island E.  Each of the 
three DDG nodes “owns” one of the SOF units on 
the FOB.  Note that every node was given 
capability in most of the eight warfare areas (albeit 
of a somewhat differing nature) except for the 
CVN and FFG in BMD, the CVN, FFG and CG in 
SOF, and the DDGs in Mines.  This was done to 
balance platform loadings so that individual 
players in D would not be overloaded with 
(heterogeneous) assets to control.  It is also 
important to bear in mind that many of the 
capabilities of a particular node in D extend only 
within its local geographical region due to finite 



























4TTOM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB, 2HARP
1HH60
1SOF
8TLAM 3ABM 1UAV 6SM2
1FAB,2HARP
1MH53 1HH60







4TTOM 1UAV 6SM2 1FAB, 2HARP
1HH60
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The functional (F) organizational nodes are 
depicted vertically in the columns of Table 3.  In 
this organization a player/DM node “owns” all of 
the assets relevant to his/her warfare area across 
the entire AOR.  Each player, then, is a warfare 
area commander.  In addition, the operating 
environment for the game was such that any player 
(e.g., Strike Warfare Commander) had the 
authority to launch aircraft or fire TLAM from any 
platform.  It was implicitly assumed that each 
warfare area commander was “located” on a 
particular platform, although this had no bearing 
on the actual game play.  For reference, the Strike 
Commander was assumed to be located on the 
CVN, the BMD Commander on the DDGA, the 
ISR Commander on the DDGB, the AWC on the 
CG, the ASuWC/MWC on the FFG, and the 
SOF/SAR Commander on the DDGC. 
 
One of the goals in building the F organization was 
to have no overlap in capabilities across functional 
areas.  This was largely achieved, as each asset has 
capability in just one resource dimension as shown 
in Table 2.  However, there were some exceptions: 
1) All subplatforms (F18s, HH60, etc.) have some 
ISR capability; hence ISR is not unique to only the 
UAVs.  We mitigated this overlap in ISR among 
warfare commanders by emphasizing the role of 
the UAVs for ground ISR within Countries A and 
B, and reducing the ISR capability of the F18s to 
detect/identify ground contacts.  2) The tactical 
tomahawks (TTOMs) do have strike capability, yet 
the BMD commander owns these assets.  In the 
experiment we stressed the importance of the 
TTOM as the weapon of choice for destroying 
SCUD missile launchers, and severely limited their 
number within the JTF to help assure that TTOMs 
would not be used for “normal” strike operations.  
Conversely, the scenarios were designed to make it 
difficult to destroy a SML using a TLAM (that is, 
it was imperative to have a weapon in the area 
given the short set-up and fire time of SCUDs), 
and using an F18S would be “overkill”. 
 
6. Scenario Design 
As has been noted, the objective was to design two 
scenarios – each based upon the task graph of 
Figure 2 – such that one scenario (d) would be 
congruent with organization D but misfit or 
incongruent to organization F.  Conversely, the 
second scenario (f) would be congruent with 
organization F but misfit to organization D.  One 
of the underlying hypotheses that we are testing is 
that congruence between organization and mission 
leads to good performance, i.e., organizations that 
are congruent with their mission will perform 
better than those that are incongruent. 
   
In this section the design of scenarios d and f are 
discussed.  Several factors drove the design. 
 
6.1 Resource Requirements for Task Classes 
The two organizations differed primarily with 
respect to the assets (and hence the resource/ 
functional capabilities) that each DM node owned.  
The congruence model postulates that inter-DM 
coordination is a major contributor to workload, 
and that the degree of predicted (structural) 
congruence is inversely related to the amount of 
inter-DM (inter-nodal) coordination needed to 
accomplish the mission.  Therefore, by adjusting 
the resource requirements of selected task classes it 
becomes possible to manipulate the inter-DM 
coordination needed to successfully prosecute 
these tasks for a given organization-scenario 
pairing.  Thus, we set out to design a number of 
tasks within scenario f such that little coordination 
would be needed within organization F, while 
significant coordination would be needed by 
organization D.  The case is reversed for scenario d 
wherein tasks must be designed to favor D while 
being mismatched to F.  For example, a task 
requiring a single asset in each of three functional 
areas would need three DMs to coordinate in F, but 
could be performed by a single DM in D – 
provided that he/she owned assets in all of the 
requisite areas.  Similarly, a task requiring multiple 
assets in a single functional area is well-suited to F, 
but would need multiple players in organization D 
to “pool” their assets.   
 
The task classes considered for this coordination 
manipulation included: (1) all of the key “mission” 
tasks as shown in the task graph of Figure 2, and to 
a lesser extent (2) search and rescue, mine clearing, 
SAM sites and enemy destroyers.  To both the f 
and d scenarios we further added a number of 
time-critical “pop-up” or unanticipated tasks that 
have complex resource requirements, such as have 
the mission tasks.  These were high priority tasks 
that need to be accomplished in a finite time 
window – e.g. a white merchant ship hitting a mine 
or coming under attack by hostile aircraft.  For 
each of the f and d scenarios we added between 5-7 
such tasks, thereby providing an additional means 
to further manipulate (in)congruence. 
 
Task Resource Requirements: Scenario d 
The list of task classes within scenario d is given in 
Table 4.  There were a total of 35 task classes used 
in the design of this scenario, where the number of 
instantiations (i.e., individual tasks) of each class 
ranged between 1 and 20 depending on the class. 
  
An example of how a task’s resource requirement 
differentially drives the coordination demands 
within D and F is shown by the mission task NBE 
(“destroy Naval Base East”).  This task needs 1 
unit of ASuW, 2 units of Strike, and 1 unit of SOF.  
In the D organization any one of three DDG 
commanders could accomplish the task alone, with 
no inter-DM coordination required.  [With 
reference to Table 3 each DDG “owns” a SOF unit, 
TLAM strike assets and a fast attack boat (FAB).]  
On the other hand, three players in the F 
organization – the Strike, ASuW and SOF/SAR 
warfare area commanders – would need to 
coordinate to properly process this task.  But 
coordination must have an element of time 
synchronization if it is to be meaningful in our 
experimental setting.  In the scenario each task had 
a time window (Tw) within which all of the assets 
allocated to that task must commence their 
individual attacks.  The NBE had a Tw of 40sec.  
Once the first asset allocated to NBE begins its 
attack, a 40sec countdown begins within which 
time all of the additional assets allocated to NBE 
must begin their attack.  If less than the task’s full 
resource requirements are met the team receives 
only a partial score on the task.  The value of Tw 
for each task class roughly scaled with the number 




















NBE Naval base - East 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
NBW Naval base - West 0 0 1 0 2 0 0
CMD Enemy command center 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
DG Missile-firing destroyer 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
PT fast patrol/missile craft 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
CDL coastal defense launcher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
SML SCUD msl launcher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
AC aircraft attack wave 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ABE Air base - East 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
ABW Air base - West 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
SAM SAM site - fixed 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
ANU commercial air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SNU white/merchant ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDM CD cruise missile 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MIS SCUD-launched missile 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
MIN sea mines 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
XOC exocet fired at blue ships 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
APH possible  hostile air: Yes 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
APH possible  hostile air: No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SPH possible  hostile ship: Yes 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
SPH possible  hostile ship: No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SA3 mobile SAM site 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
EW possible SCUD launch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S&R basic rescue effort at sea 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
RGF red ground force 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
SML SCUD 2nd msl launcher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
BR major bridge 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
PRT final goal - secure Port 0 0 1 0 2 0 1
TSK F14 down & under attack 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
TSK rescue at POW camp 0 0 1 0 2 1 0
TSK ship hit mine; under attack 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
EVA evacuate wounded 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
HOS hostage taker at sea 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
CAP aircraft attacker/defender 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
SA6 SAM netted cluster 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
   Table 4: Task Resource Requirements, Scenario d
 
The high-priority (unanticipated) tasks are listed as 
TSK in Table 4.  There were three such classes 
with two task instantiations in each.  Note that the 
resource requirements span a number of warfare 
areas, yet in all cases the tasks were designed to be 
accomplished by a single DM in organization D.  
In selecting the requirements for these multi-
resource tasks, care was taken to assure that the 
tasks would appear to be “realistic”, i.e., requiring 
assets that might normally work together.  These 
TSK tasks (as well as the slightly less complex 
S&R, HOS, EVA) are time-critical, i.e., unlike the 
mission tasks, they must be accomplished before a 
deadline or else they “disappear” or expire.  This 
places an added stress upon the players by urging 
them to react in a timely manner. 
 
Task Resource Requirements: Scenario f 
The list of task classes within scenario f is given in 
Table 5.  There were also a total of 35 task classes 
used here, with most having the same name as in 
scenario d, but with considerably different 
resource requirements.  For example, the NBW 
mission task requires six units of strike in this 
scenario.  In the F organization the Strike 
commander can accomplish this task as a single 
DM using a combination of F18S (from the CVN 
or AOF) and/or TLAM fired from any of 4 
platforms.  On the other hand, in the D 
organization two or three players must coordinate 
to synchronize their attack using their strike assets.  
Note that each DDG or CG commander possesses 
enough TLAM assets to accomplish the NBE task 
by himself.  However, the NBE’s time window of 
40s, coupled with an imposed time delay of 23s 
between successive TLAM launches, implies that 
no more than two TLAMs from a single platform 
can be used to attack NBE.  A similar construct 
exists for most other task classes requiring strike 
assets.  For example, the SAM sites that require 
two units of strike within a 20s window, must be 
accomplished via a two-DM coordination in the D 
organization, but can be accomplished by the 
Strike Commander in F acting alone. 
 
The resource requirements for the major mission 
tasks in f were adjusted to require coordination 
among two or more DMs in D but not in F.  
Another example of the need for multi-person 
intra-task coordination is the Air base East (ABE) 
that needs three DMs to coordinate to satisfy the 
3SOF resource requirement.  In addition to these 
mission tasks, the unanticipated and time-critical 
tasks were crafted to place further demands on 
team coordination.  These tasks are not directly 
part of the mission task graph to allow 
considerable flexibility on the location and timing 
of their appearance in the scenario.  When 
designing the requirements and locations for many 
of these tasks it became necessary to assure that 
the tasks could indeed be accomplished (in the 
time allotted) by the assets that the organization 
owns!  For example, the search and rescue (S&R) 
tasks require 2 units of SAR; the mine tasks (MIN) 
require 2 units of MIN, etc.  However, the team 
has a limited number of HH60s (the SAR-capable 
assets), and MH53s (used for mine clearing).  
Model-based analysis was used extensively to 
assure that limited assets could indeed be 
scheduled to accomplish all of the tasks.  For some 
task classes, timing and location of tasks were 
modified; for some other classes it was necessary 
to reduce the number of tasks.  To assure that tasks 
(and even the overall mission) would be accom-
plished in a reasonable time, asset velocities were 
increased when necessary.  In addition, NPS 
students “play-tested” both the f and d scenarios to 
further assure that the design goals were being met, 




















NBE Naval base - East 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
NBW Naval base - West 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
CMD Enemy command center 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
DG Missile-firing destroyer 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
PT fast patrol/missile craft 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
CDL coastal defense launcher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
SML SCUD msl launcher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
AC aircraft attack wave 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
ABE Air base - East 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
ABW Air base - West 0 0 0 0 6 0 0
SAM SAM site - fixed 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
ANU commercial air 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SNU white/merchant ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDM CD cruise missile 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
MIS SCUD-launched missile 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
MIN sea mines 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
XOC exocet fired at blue ships 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
APH possible  hostile air: Yes 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
APH possible  hostile air: No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SPH possible  hostile ship: Yes 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
SPH possible  hostile ship: No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SA3 mobile SAM site 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
EW possible SCUD launch 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S&R basic rescue effort at sea 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
RGF red ground force 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
SML SCUD 2nd msl launcher 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
BR major bridge 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
PRT final goal - secure Port 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
TSK enemy hidden airbase 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
TSK enemy shipping blockade 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
TSK terrorist leader seen 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
EVA evacuate wounded 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
GUN gun runners 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
CAP aircraft attacker/defender 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
SA6 SAM netted cluster 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
   Table 5: Task Resource Requirements, Scenario f
 
6.2 Inter-task Coordination 
Adjustment of task resource requirements was 
used as a primary manipulator of intra-task 
coordination.  In addition, inter-task coordination 
was manipulated in the d and f scenarios largely 
via the task dependency structure as exhibited in 
the task graph.  Successive tasks in the task graph 
have an implied information flow due to their 
precedence order – task B cannot be started until 
prerequisite task A is completed.  This has 
implications for asset management as regards the 
preparation/readiness of assets for the downstream 
tasks.  If successive tasks involve different DMs 
then information on the status/planning of 
prerequisite tasks must be passed between DMs, 
thus requiring inter-DM information coordination. 
 
If contiguous pieces of the task graph could be 
allocated to a single DM (via the design of 
resource requirements of tasks and their immediate 
prerequisites) inter-DM coordination would be 
reduced.  To the extent that this was possible, the 
task graph was built to minimize inter-task 
coordination by DMs in the congruent situations 
(Dd and Ff) and to require inter-task coordination 
among successive tasks in the non-congruent 
situations (Df and Fd).  For example, in the f 
scenario (see Table 5 and Figure 2) the lower 
branch of the task graph has a heavy dependence 
on SOF assets and is largely allocated to the SOF 
commander in F; the upper branch is largely under 
the responsibility of the Strike Commander.  In 
scenario d (see Table 4) the multi-resource tasks 
were designed so that one of the DDG 
commanders in D would have the assets and 
responsibility for the tasks in the east (lower 
branch); another DDG commander could handle 
the west (upper branch).  Clearly, in the mis-
matched or incongruent situations, different DMs 
are needed to process successive tasks simply as a 
result of the different resource requirements.  
While this was not a major manipulation in the 
scenario design process for this experiment, it can 
prove to be a very salient mechanism for 
manipulating congruence in situations that have 
higher inter-task information flow requirements – 
especially in those cases where the team does not 
have a global (common) information structure. 
 
6.3 Spatial-Temporal Loading 
The adjustment of arrival times, locations and 
trajectories of the many task classes that make up 
the “defend” tasks provides a second powerful 
mechanism to adjust the f and d scenarios vis-à-vis 
the two organizations.  The resource requirements 
focussed on manipulating coordination; the spatial-
temporal mechanism manipulated (differential) 
loading among the team’s DMs.  The task classes 
that fall into this category include: 
 
AC = enemy air attackers 
APH = possibly hostile aircraft (about 50% are 
indeed hostile) 
CDM = cruise missiles fired from coastal 
defense launchers (CDLs) 
MIN = enemy mines (except those that are 
mission task prerequisites) 
PT = enemy patrol/missile boats 
DG = enemy missile-firing destroyers 
SPH = possibly hostile surface craft (about 
50% are indeed hostile) 
 
The timing and location of sea search and rescue 
tasks (S&R) were also part of this manipulation.  
Most of these task classes had simple resource 
requirements: for example a single unit of AAW or 
ASuW for AC and PT, respectively.  However, 
each scenario contained a large number (13-15) of 
such tasks, thereby allowing for the construction of 
task “waves” to vary the workload for different 
DMs in a carefully orchestrated manner. 
 
Spatial-Temporal Loading: Scenario d 
In scenario d the task “waves” were built to be 
relatively easy for players in D, while being 
difficult for players in F.  Thus, the waves typically 
consisted of many tasks with the same resource 
requirements spread over a broad geographical 
area – for example a large coordinated enemy air 
attack that simultaneously targeted a number of 
fixed platforms.  Clearly, this would pose a 
significant problem for the AWC in organization F 
not only because of the load but also due to the 
need to focus on several disjoint areas of the 
battlespace at the same time.  Players in the D 
organization would not experience as much 
difficulty in countering this wave since the load 
would be distributed among several DMs, with 
each focussing on but a small piece of the AOR. 
 
A number of waves comprising either air, surface, 
mines or search and rescue tasks were constructed.  
A wave generally consisted of between 3 and 5 
individual tasks, and was spaced roughly every 
300s in the simulation so as to minimize overlap 
with successive waves.  Overall there was about 
two air, two surface, one mine, and two SAR 
waves.  In some cases the waves were adjusted to 
coincide with time critical (pop-up or 
unanticipated) tasks that had resource requirements 
in common with those of the primary wave. 
 
In addition to the adjustment of tasks to overload 
the AWC, ASuWC, and SOF/SAR commander in 
F, we also adjusted the arrival times and locations 
of the SCUD missile launchers (SMLs) in scenario 
d to make their processing in F more difficult.  
Their appearances were such that SMLs arrived in 
pairs, in separated areas within countries A and B.  
It was expected that this would be more 
problematical for the ISR and BMD commanders 
in F than for two players in D where each one was 
concerned with only a single geographical area. 
 
Spatial-Temporal Loading: Scenario f 
In scenario f the task “waves” were built to be 
relatively easy for players in F, while being 
difficult for players in D.  Thus, a wave typically 
consisted of a number of tasks with different 
resource requirements focussing on a narrow 
geographical area.  An example of such a wave 
might be a coordinated attack on DDGA by enemy 
air and enemy surface and/or mines, while at the 
same time requiring the DDGA commander to 
conduct a search and rescue or a SCUD task!  This 
would create an overload condition for the targeted 
DM in the D organization.  But since these tasks 
are spread over several functional areas, players in 
the F organization would share the processing load, 
and so this “wave” would be relatively easier to 
process by the F organization. 
The two scenarios do have a common task graph, 
primarily to ease the training requirements that 
were deemed to be excessive if players had to learn 
two entirely different task graphs.  Since the two 
scenarios are markedly different in their task 
resource requirements, it was not clear how to 
operationalize “equivalence”.  One could talk 
about numbers of tasks, but this is not a realistic 
mode of comparison as tasks are quite different – 
except possibly for the self-defend tasks.  Instead, 
we attempted to equalize the scenarios by adjusting 
the number of tasks in each scenario such that the 
total resource demands summed over all tasks 
would be roughly the same.  This is computed by 
summing each resource category ri over all 
scenario tasks that have ri in their resource 
requirement vector.  These comparisons are shown 
in Table 6. 
 
There were approximately 8-10 such multi-
functional waves created within scenario f, each 
wave lasting for about 200sec.  We attempted to 
have each player node in D experience two such 
waves over the course of the game.  As was the 
case in building scenario d, the waves often 
coincided with time critical (pop-up or UT) tasks 
especially if those tasks added an additional 
required resource category to the “mix”. scenario AAW Mines ASuW BMD Strike SAR SOF
f 39 10 34 20 75 16 1
d 49 9 34 20 69 16 13
Table 6: f and d scenario comparisons
3 
One advantage of the F organization is that one 
DM owns all the assets to process a large class of 
tasks.  No negotiation is needed among DMs as to 
who will perform which task and with which asset, 
as would be the case in a D organization with 
overlapping areas of responsibility.  To force the 
need for players in D to coordinate, the flight paths 
of enemy SCUD-launched missiles were crafted to 
“boundary split” the areas between adjacent DMs, 
as were the paths of several surface threats, and the 
locations of enemy missile sites.  In such cases 
inter-DM coordination is needed within D to most 
efficiently apportion the team’s scarce assets 
(“who will do the task”), but such coordination is 
not needed in F. 
The numbers are equivalent for Mines, ASuW, 
BMD, SAR and SOF categories.  Scenario f has 
greater Strike requirements, while d has higher 
AAW requirements.  It must be noted however that 
the cross-functional requirements within the tasks 
themselves are absent from such a comparison – 
the coordination demands that this places on an 
organization is, of course, a function of both the 
scenario and the organizational structure. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper presented the details behind the design 
of two scenarios that were used in a team-in-the-
loop experiment to test organizational congruence.  
A unique aspect of this work was the “reverse” 
engineering process used to design scenarios d and 
f, starting with the definitions of two very different 
organizational structures D and F.  A second aspect 
of the work involved the use of the analytical 
models that predict the degree of fit (or 
congruence) between an organization and the 
mission it faces.  These model predictions guided – 
at virtually every step – the selection of task 
requirements, locations, task graph dependencies, 
etc., that in total define a scenario.  Iteration 
between the modelers and the experimenters in our 
design team helped assure that the scenarios to be 
tested in the laboratory would be both 
 
6.4 Equivalence between Scenarios f and d 
The testing of congruence involves comparing the 
performance on scenario d between organization D 
(congruent) and F (incongruent).  The reverse 
comparison holds for scenario f.  It has been 
suggested that the experiment could also provide a 
comparison between performance on scenarios f 
and d when performed by a single organization (D 
or F).  This type of cross-scenario comparison 
depends on having some “equivalence” between 
the two scenarios in terms of difficulty, workload, 
etc.  Clearly, if scenario f was significantly 
“easier” than scenario d, then comparison of 
performance between the two could not readily be 
ascribed to an organizational dimension. 
 
reasonable/believable and model-driven to enable 
subsequent model-data comparisons. 
 
A major congruence metric (of among several) is 
the degree of inter-node coordination.  As this 
coordination is a function of the organizational 
structure and the mission/task requirements the 
scenario design process focused considerable effort 
on the selection of task resource requirements.  
Tasks in the congruent situations (Ff and Dd) were 
designed to require low inter-node coordination, 
whereas in the incongruent cases (Fd and Df) tasks 
were designed to have higher coordination 
demands.  The tasks used for this instantiation 
included the major mission tasks, time-critical high 
priority tasks, and several others.  Another metric 
that enters into congruence is workload imbalance.  
By adjusting the spatial and temporal arrivals of 
the tasks that dealt with defending against the 
enemy, we were able to differentially load 
individual nodes within either the D or F 
organizations, and unevenly load the team in the 
incongruent cases yet for the same scenario have a 
balanced/distributed workload in the congruent 
cases.  Other, less salient manipulations in the 
scenarios were also effected (e.g., boundary 
splitting, information flows, situational awareness) 
that were geared to make the incongruent cases 
relatively more difficult than the congruent case.  
In short, we used the knowledge gained from 
earlier laboratory-based experiences along with 
guidance from model predictions to design the 
scenarios and “tune” the organizations. 
 
Experiment 8 was conducted in August and 
November 2002 at the Naval Postgraduate School 
using eight teams.  Four teams were organized as 
D and four as F, and each team was exposed to the 
f and d scenario twice, in counterbalanced order.  
A companion paper [Diedrich et al, 2003] 
describes results that convincingly show that 
performance in the congruent cases significantly 
exceeded that in the non-congruent cases.  Some of 
the measures used to assess performance include 
number of tasks accomplished, accuracy, 
timeliness/latency.  Having firmly established the 
value of congruence as a construct in “optimal” 
organizational design, our next step in our A2C2 
research will be to examine the processes that 
teams employed to try to overcome poor 
performance in the incongruent cases, whether 
players were aware of any factors that caused their 
performance decrement, and what human teams 
are likely to do about it: e.g., adapt their structure 
(roles/responsibilities/assets) or just cope? 
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